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Iron triangles and subsidies: understanding the long-term role of the
government on Swedish commercial fisheries
Jonas Hentati-Sundberg 1,2, Katharina Fryers Hellquist 2 and Andreas Duit 3,4
ABSTRACT. Many natural resources have degraded and collapsed despite being managed under rigorous institutional frameworks
set up to ensure rational exploitation. Path dependency of dysfunction institutions has been suggested as an explanation for such
undesired outcomes. We explore the role of path dependency in natural resource management by studying a 100-year evolution of
Swedish fisheries. We rely on three main types of original longitudinal data collected for the period 1914–2016: (A) policy documents,
(B) government spending on management and subsidies, and (C) catch and fleet data. Our analysis contrasts the periods before and
after the Swedish entrance into the European Union (1995) because this marks the year when fisheries policy became beyond the direct
influence of the Swedish government. We uncover four pieces of evidence suggesting the existence of a path dependent dynamic in the
pre-EU period: (1) despite increasing insights on the vulnerability of fish stocks to overexploitation, national policy goals in relation
to fisheries continuously promoted incompatible goals of social and economic growth but without any reference to the sustainability
of the biological resources; (2) the same policy instruments were used over long periods; (3) actor constellations within the fisheries
policy subsystem were stable over time; (4) neither political regime nor macroeconomic variables and fisheries performance (industry
production, oil price, landing values) could explain observed temporal variation in subsidies. We conclude that key policy actors in the
pre-EU period formed an “iron triangle” and thereby prevented necessary policy changes. These national reinforcing feedbacks have
been weakened since EU entrance, and the indicators for path dependency show broader involvement of stakeholders, a shift in spending,
and policy goals that now explicitly address ecological sustainability.
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INTRODUCTION
In the scientific discussion on sustainable use of natural resources,
there is a classic divide between proponents of state control or
privatization (Hardin 1968) and those emphasizing actors’ self-
organizational capacities in solving common property problems
(Ostrom 1990, 2009). Both these strains of literature have an
important thing in common: a tendency to disregard the fact that
most natural resources and ecosystems are today governed by
political and administrative institutions rather than by self-
organizing users. Although it is true that collective action
problems underlie many cases of natural resources
overexploitation, overlooking the pivotal role of state actors and
agencies often generates an incomplete model of real-world
social-ecological systems (Finley 2011, Duit 2014, Stoll et al.
2016).  
Many fisheries share the typical properties of overexploited
natural resource systems. Although many fish stocks have
recovered in recent years (Lotze et al. 2011, Ricard et al. 2012,
Costello et al. 2016), overexploitation has been persistent and
many stocks still suffer from past and present management
failures (Ricard et al. 2012, FAO 2016). The well-known collapse
of cod stocks off  the coast of Newfoundland is an empirical
example of how dynamics between state actors and the fishing
industry can play out in collective action situations. These cod
stocks had sustained an unregulated international fishery for
centuries but collapsed within 15 years from the introduction of
the Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone. Subsequent research
suggests that scientific optimism on the stock growth potential
and expansive national fleet policies played a key role in the
collapse (Walters and Maguire 1996, Mason 2002). National
policies have often catalyzed fishing fleet development with a goal
to increase national shares of catches (Borgström 1966, Pauly
2006, Finley 2011, Österblom and Folke 2015). As of today the
fishing industry remains heavily subsidized by national
governments and overexploitation persists, leading to declining
global catches (Watson et al. 2013, Pauly and Zeller 2016, Sumaila
et al. 2016).  
We suggest that the role of formal government institutions has
been underestimated in the study of sustainability in fisheries and
other resource systems, which motivated us to perform an
empirical long-term analysis of policy making in this context.
Specifically, we employ path dependency (PD) theory to analyze
the evolution of Swedish fisheries (1914–2016). Although there
are many different types of policy process dynamics with
relevance for understanding natural resource management (see
Orach and Schlüter 2016 for an overview), we focus specifically
on one such policy-making dynamic: path dependency. We have
chosen PD theory for three reasons. First, previous studies have
argued that PD is a common phenomenon in most institutional
settings (Pierson 2003, Duit 2007) and should therefore be of
general relevance for the study of resource management
institutions. Second, from a sustainability perspective, PD theory
can generate more refined insights into the complex processes
generating suboptimal management outcomes within formal,
hierarchical, and politically controlled management institutions.
Third, the idea of path dependent institutions resonates with
theory building on resilience of social-ecological systems (SES),
which has suggested that reinforcing feedbacks and “traps” can
explain undesired trajectories in social-ecological systems (e.g.,
Nyström et al. 2012, Boonstra and de Boer 2014).  
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Our paper contributes to the available literature in three main
respects. First, we compile and analyze a unique longitudinal
qualitative and quantitative dataset of policy documents, policy
actors, fishery subsidies, fleet size, and catches. Second, we
develop a framework for systematically analyzing path
dependency in SES. Third, we demonstrate that SES analyses
should to a greater extent consider the role and dynamic of
government institutions in managing natural resources.
STUDY FRAMEWORK
Research within policy studies, public administration, historical
institutionalism, and institutional economics have argued that PD
is a common phenomenon encountered in most forms of public
governance. The idea is that most institutions and regulations are,
in principle, path dependent to a certain degree (Arthur 1994, Kay
2003, Pierson 2003). Path dependency can explain why
institutions, and thereby policy making, seem to be stable over
time in the sense that drastic and significant changes in policy
outputs and institutional configuration occurs very rarely (Jones
et al. 1998, Pierson 2000). It also offers an explanation for why
even severely dysfunctional or inefficient institutions can persist
over long periods of time (Arthur 1994, Pierson 2003). PD within
public administration and policy studies has several different
definitions (Kay 2003), but the most widely accepted form defines
PD as a self-reinforcing process driven by increasing marginal
returns, i.e., that the value of an institution (a set of rules)
increases over time for its users (Arthur 1994, Pierson 2003). A
classic example is the QWERTY key board, which despite being
an inefficient design for typing speed, has nevertheless remained
the dominant design for keyboards worldwide. Pierson (2003) has
argued that political institutions display similar features: they are
often inefficient, remarkably stable, and sensitive to initial
conditions in the historical trajectory.  
The notion of path dependency can be linked to theoretical
models in the SES tradition (Boonstra and de Boer 2014).
Resource management studies have frequently shown that
ecosystems are difficult to change back after collapses (Scheffer
et al. 2001, Folke et al. 2004, Scheffer 2009). Complex systems
research refers to this feature as state-dependence (Sugihara et al.
2012, Levin et al. 2013). State-dependence and path dependency
are similar by noting the “stickiness” of complex systems; SES
literature includes a number of specific mechanisms, termed
reinforcing feedbacks, that promote such stability (Nyström et al.
2012).  
Critics of path dependency theory have argued that many
empirical applications tend to be theory-driven and consisting in
just-so stories that cannot be falsified by empirical data (Pierson
2000, Kay 2003, Duit 2007). It is therefore important to design
studies so that the absence of path dependency has an equal
chance of finding support in the data. This has been the main
analytical strategy for the study design of this paper.  
We translated PD theory into four hypotheses. Our first two
hypotheses centered on policy goals and policy instruments
selected and employed by government actors throughout the
history of the policy subsystem. We assume that PD, if  present,
will be manifested in significant stability in policy goals and
increases in investments in the main policy instruments. Policy
instruments are operationalized as the total government spending
on fisheries, which has been organized as a number of subsidy
programs. Stable policy goals and instruments and increasing
investments are considered a sign of increasing returns to the
institutional framework, whereas shifting goals, changing policy
instruments, and varying levels of investments in the policy
instruments all would indicate absence of a PD process. We
hypothesized that,  
H1: Policy goals will exhibit a high degree of internal stability
and consistency over time.  
H2: Investments in main policy instruments (subsidies) will
increase over time.  
Stability in policy objectives and choice of policy instrument are
important indicators of path dependency in a policy-making
institution, but the absence of change does not necessarily imply
PD at play. A well-established finding within policy studies is that
most policy subsystems are based on a coalition of actors who
agree on problems, goals, and instruments (Sabatier 1999). The
stability of the policy coalition is thus essential for stability of the
policy subsystem and we assume that changes, i.e., actors leaving
or entering the institution, in the set of actors active within the
institutional structure would indicate an absence of a PD
trajectory. Our hypothesis was,  
H3: Actor constellations will be constant over time.  
Finally, we were interested in the robustness of the PD process to
external shocks and disturbances. If  genuinely path dependent,
the primary driver of the historical trajectory should be itself,
which means that external events will not have a systematic
relationship with the state of the path dependent institution.
Consequently, our last hypothesis was,  
H4: Policy instruments will be resistant to exogenous shocks.
METHODS AND DATA
Our four hypotheses were tested for the period from the onset of
national fisheries policy in the early 20th century until Sweden
entered the European Union (1995). We also analyzed data for
1995 onward to investigate whether any change could be detected
after the EU entrance.  
To test H1, stable policy goals, we backtracked official policy goals
throughout the study period. We relied on Swedish Government
Official Reports (“Statens Offentliga Utredningar,” SOU),
reports by committees appointed by the government on issues in
anticipation of a proposed legislation. All major policy changes
and legislation in Sweden are supposed to be preceded by a
government oversight committee consisting of experts and
representatives for organized interests within the policy area. The
committee conducts investigations and makes recommendations
for policy in the form of a committee report delivered to the
relevant minister. This system is a cornerstone in Sweden’s social
corporatist governance system designed to allow for the key
national interests to reach agreements and solve conflicts before,
rather than after, the implementation of a policy (Lewin and
Lindvall 2015). These reports were used because they provide a
rich background to the perceived reform needs as well as a
summary of the goals of the current policy at the time of the
report. We performed an in-depth qualitative analysis of all
reports relating to Swedish fisheries published during the study
period (n = 9, temporal scope 1922–2010).  
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To test H2, increase in spending over time, we relied on the Swedish
government budget (1914–2016), and for the period since Swedish
entrance into the EU in 1995, also data from the EU Commission
(1995–2016; Appendix 1). Following Sumaila et al. (2010), all
spending was categorized into a number of subcategories, sorted
under three main categories: beneficial, capacity-enhancing, and
ambiguous. These three categories were defined in relation to their
expected effect on fishing sustainability, whereby the beneficial
category includes research and management; the capacity-
enhancing includes direct industry support, i.e., fuel subsidies,
ship-building support, port construction, marketing support, and
fishery development projects; and the ambiguous category
includes industry support that has effects that are difficult to
evaluate in terms of sustainability, such as financing the
unemployment fund for fishermen and vessel scrapping subsidies.
Detailed motivations and descriptions of the different subsidy
categories are given in Table A1.1. A list of all types of
governmental spending on fisheries observed during the study
period and how we categorized them is given in Tables A1.2 and
A1.3. Our analysis focuses on commercial sea fisheries, and we
therefore excluded support to commercial freshwater fisheries,
recreational fisheries, and aquaculture. Generally, the budget
proposals explained succinctly the purpose of a specific spending
program, which allowed us to directly assign them to the relevant
category. In some cases, where the purpose was less clear from the
budget proposal, we traced the specific program back to the legal
text, published in the form of Royal Decrees (1892–1993) and
Statutes of the Swedish Board of Fisheries (1985–2010). Both
these are legally binding regulations and announcements. We
controlled annual spending for inflation using the Swedish
Consumer Price Index (CPI; Statistics Sweden 2019); all values
in the paper are expressed in fixed prices (Swedish Krona in year
2011 values, 10 SEK ≈ 1.1 €).  
Data to test H3 was derived from Swedish Government Official
Reports (described above). Each report lists all individuals that
acted as committee members, along with organizational
affiliations. Hence, we could identify key organized interest in the
fishery policy sector and tracked the distribution of these actor
constellations over time.  
To test H4 we analyzed statistically whether political regime and
macroeconomic variables could explain interannual changes in
spending, using General Linear Models. We used models with
two different dependent variables: (1) the total amount of
governmental spending on fisheries, and (2) the ratio of beneficial
to capacity-enhancing subsidies. As independent variables we
used manufacturing industry production, political regime in the
Swedish government (categorical variable), oil price, landing
value of the total Swedish fishery, year and 1–5 y time lags of the
dependent variable to handle temporal autocorrelation. The
motivation for those variables was the following. Manufacturing
industry production was used to capture the general economic
activity of the country (business cycle) because fisheries-related
spending could be expected to follow the general economic
activity of the country. We did not use GDP because fishing would
to a small degree be reflected in the GDP figure, creating a
dependency in the data. Swedish political regime was used to seek
out a political difference in the government’s spending. We used
three categories based on the political history of Sweden: (i)
social-democratic, (ii) liberal/conservative, and (iii) mixed/
technocratic. Oil prices were used because they have been shown
earlier to strongly affect the economy of fishing fleets (Cheilari
et al. 2013) and thereby could be hypothesized to drive increased
subsidies. Landing value was used to search for a possible intrinsic
system feedback from fisheries performance to subsidy spending.
Year was used to account for a long-term trend in the spending
that could not be explained by the above-described variables but
any other type of long-term change, for example, relating to
increasing knowledge or technological development. For the
statistical analysis we used an information theoretic approach
where we fitted models with all combinations of variables and
calculated model weights and average parameter values based on
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Burnham et al. 2011). With
the relatively long final time-series data set (1915–1994, 80 years)
we believe that any signal from the economic and/or political side
on subsidies would be detected using this approach.  
In order to assess the effect of subsidies on the fishing industry
and fishing sustainability, we collected data on number of fishing
vessels and their engine power from official statistical yearbooks
(1914–1995) and the current Swedish governmental fishing fleet
database (1996–2014). From this, we calculated the annual fishing
fleet size measured in kW. We also collected data on landings for
different species, which we summarized by year.
RESULTS
Policy goals 1914–2014
The goals of the Swedish fisheries policy from the early 20th
century until the EU entrance shows a gradual development from
no specified goal toward increasingly detailed and convoluted
goal formulations (Table 1). In 1948, a central government agency,
Swedish Board of Fisheries, was established as the first national
institution to provide for the development of the Swedish fishing
sector. This happened as a result of the 1945 fisheries investigation
that was commissioned to investigate the possibilities of sector
development in the post-WW2 era (Swedish Board of Fisheries
1998). The introduction of a central and coordinated
responsibility, and the establishment of a central policy goal for
fisheries defines the start of a national expansion phase of
Swedish fisheries (Table 1).  
In 1970, the goals were expanded and partly reformulated. We
consider this a consolidation phase for the policy developed
during the expansion era (Table 1). Fishing was now articulated
as a sector with great importance for the Swedish society for
employment, cheap nutrition, and general welfare. The
consolidation of policy goals and the increased budget spending
arose from a set of immediate intrinsic and extrinsic problems
perceived to face the fishing sector, including fleet over-capacity,
profitability problems, lack of demand of some heavily targeted
species, collapse of North Sea herring, and international law
development in which Sweden lost traditional fishing grounds in
the NE Atlantic (SOU 1977).  
Since 1995, Swedish fisheries policy is subsumed under the
Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union. EU policy
goals for fisheries (which were revised in 2002 and 2014) do
consider social and economic aspects of the fishing sector, but
are also explicitly referencing ecological sustainability, which
contrasts with the national goals in the pre-EU period (Table 1).
With H1 we hypothesized that policy goals would be stable over
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Table 1. Goals of the Swedish fisheries policy 1914–1995, and goals for the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) added for reference.
Original quotes in Swedish were translated by the article authors.
 
Policy phase Year Summary
Early
Development
1914–1946 No stated overarching goal, but a range of specific management measures aimed at stimulating, (i) fisheries
research (mainly finding new fishing waters and developing fishing gear), (ii) development of new fisheries
(including distant water fisheries), (iv) port construction and other fisheries infrastructure, and, (iv) improved
economic status of the fisheries sector through marketing support and various direct subsidies to the fishing
fleet (See also Table A1.1)
Expansion 1947–1969 The goal for the Swedish fisheries shall be [...] to maintain income levels approximately in level with agriculture.
[...] Based on the discouraging experiences of the development of the fishing sector in the period after the last war
[WW1], the investigation is concerned that a relatively extensive subsidy program will be needed in order to
maintain profits at such levels. [...] The investigation will however stress that such support cannot be considered
desirable, but must be a last resort if profitability cannot be otherwise maintained at a satisfying level. (SOU
1947:246)
Consolidation 1970–1994 [As decided by the Swedish government in 1970,] the goal for the fisheries policy should be to use market and
structural political measures to create stable economic conditions for a fishery that is well adapted to domestic
sales and for export. Conditions within Sweden shall be stabilized through price regulation mechanisms.
Rationalization shall be supported through structural political grants. The basis for the activities shall be to seize
the conditions for productivity within the Swedish fishing sector at the same time as the production capacity is kept
within the limits set by marketing in a longer time frame. (SOU 1977:127)
The basis for the Swedish fisheries policy is to exploit water and fish resources in such a way that it can contribute
to food supply and general welfare [...] The goal for fisheries politics is to create conditions for social standard and
work security for those working in the fishing sector that is comparable to the other industries, while consumers are
offered fish of good quality for reasonable prices. Within the limits set by responsible use of the fish supplies shall
fishing be conducted as efficient as possible and the level of catches be determined by the opportunities for
profitable and stable production. At the same time shall regional political needs for employment in coastal and
archipelagic regions be taken into consideration. (Swedish Board of Fisheries 1986:2)
EC-1 1995–2001 [...] the objective should be to provide for rational and responsible exploitation of living aquatic resources and of
aquaculture, while recognizing the interest of the fisheries sector in its long-term development and its economic and
social conditions and the interest of consumers taking into account the biological constraints with due respect for
the marine ecosystem. (EC 1992:1)
EC-2 2002–2012 The objective [...] should therefore be to provide for sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources and of
aquaculture in the context of sustainable development, taking account of the environmental, economic and social
aspects in a balanced manner. (EC 2002:1)
EC-3 2013–present The CFP should ensure that fishing and aquaculture activities contribute to long-term environmental, economic,
and social sustainability [...] Furthermore, the CFP should contribute to increased productivity, to a fair standard
of living for the fisheries sector including small-scale fisheries, and to stable markets, and it should ensure the
availability of food supplies and that they reach consumers at reasonable prices. The CFP should contribute to the
Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, and should help to achieve the objectives set out
therein. (EC 2013:art. 4)
time, while our empirical analysis reveals that the pre-EU period
did show a gradual evolution toward more complexity yet
ignoring ecological sustainability, whereas the EU entrance led
to a clear shift, specifically by referencing ecological sustainability.
Policy instruments: subsidies 1914–2014
Governmental spending on fisheries has been organized as a set
of different programs with varying temporal scope (Tables A1.2
and A1.3). Research and management spending have increased
continuously over our study period and were in the end of the
study period on the highest level recorded (Figs. 1 and 2A).
Capacity-enhancing subsidies were initially low, but increased
gradually until a peak in the 1980s, and declined thereafter (Figs.
1 and 2B). In the early 1900s, the dominating spending was on
port construction, i.e., basic infrastructure, vessel construction,
and fisheries development projects. Later, during the most heavily
subsidized period in the 1960s to 1980s, vessel construction
dominated the spending, but fishery development projects also
remained important. In recent years, all historical subsidy types
remain, but the dominating spending has been on marketing and
storage infrastructure. Diesel has remained subsidized
throughout the study period but is invisible in the governmental
budgets because the subsidy is arranged as a fuel tax exemption
(SFS 1994). Ambiguous subsidies, i.e., support that could either
lead to fleet increase or fleet reduction depending on the specific
circumstances (Table A1.1), have existed since the 1930s, and
increased after year 2000, mainly resulting from a series of
buyback programs funded by the EU and Sweden (Fig. 1 and 2C).  
In total, the governmental spending over the century-long period
was 6.2 (beneficial), 5.0 (capacity-enhancing), and 1.0
(ambiguous) billion SEK. The total spending is currently the
highest level recorded, 291 M SEK as an average for 2013–2015.  
The fishing fleet trend over time includes two broad phases; an
initial increase followed by a later decline (Fig. 3). The earlier peak
in number of fishing vessels (Fig. 3A) compared to the aggregated
engine capacity of the fleet (Fig. 3B) reflects the strong
technological development during the study period, i.e., the
average vessel has become larger. The increase in fishing capacity
from 1945 to the peak year 1988 was 297%, and from 1914 to 1988
over 800%.
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Fig. 1. Availability of different categories of subsidies over time. Green color denotes beneficial subsidies, red
capacity-enhancing, and yellow ambiguous subsidies. For full description see Table A1.1. M SEK = millions,
Swedish Krona.
Fig. 2. Change in governmental spending on fisheries (A:
beneficial, B: capacity-enhancing subsidies, and C: ambiguous)
toward fisheries (1914–2015). M SEK = millions, Swedish
Krona.
Economic theory suggests that capacity-enhancing subsidies have
a direct effect on reducing the cost of fishing and will thereby
stimulate investments in the fleet and increase fishing effort
(Sumaila et al. 2010). However, one could also argue for a reverse
causality: that a large fishing fleet requires high subsidies to
remain profitable. It is clear that the general trend in fishing fleet
size measured as engine size (Fig. 3B) coincides with capacity
Fig. 3. Size of the Swedish fishing fleet 1914–2014. (A) Number
of vessels, which is roughly proportional to the number of
commercial fishers. (B) Sum of engine power (1000 kW). Fleet
subsidies have also supported effort-increasing technologies
that are not reflected in our measure of the fleet, such as
improved gear, sonar (fish finding) technology, navigation, and
onboard facilities such as freezing technology, which suggests
that our way of measuring fishing capacity is conservative.
enhancing subsidies (cf. Fig. 2B). To further investigate the two
contrasting hypotheses on “what drives what,” we analyzed the
correlation between subsidies on fishing fleet size using temporal
lags spanning between -19 and 19 years. We found that earlier
years’ subsidies best explained present fleet development, with a
peak in prediction power of four years between subsidies and
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fishing fleet size (Fig. 4). This finding is well in line with how
subsidy programs can be expected to affect fishing fleet
development: first of all, there is a time lag between a decision to
construct a new fishing vessel until the vessel is operational;
second, subsidies for vessel construction were dominantly
transferred via a capital fund run by the government, which in
turn supported individual vessel construction and modernization
projects. Thus, a four-year lag between governmental spending
until a vessel is operational is reasonable given how the system
was organized.
Fig. 4. Temporal lags in capacity-enhancing subsidies and their
effect on fishing fleet development. (A) Left panel shows R² for
linear models having fleet size (Fig. 3B) as dependent variable,
and capacity enhancing subsidies (Fig. 2, middle panel) as
independent variable. The dotted line shows lag = 0, i.e.,
instantaneous response of the dependent variable on change of
the independent variable. The peak in correlation occurs as -4
yr lag. (B) The two time-series, plotted with a -4 yr time lag.
Grey circles denote the actual subsidies in a given year and the
black line denotes a 5-year moving average of the subsidy level.
The red line denotes the fleet size measured in 1000 kW. M
SEK = millions, Swedish Krona.
Landing quantities in Swedish fisheries has over time been driven
by a few species, notably herring and forage fish (Fig 5A). Landing
values are more evenly distributed between many species (Fig.
5B). The dramatic increase in fishing capacity during the 20th
century has not been reflected in comparable landing increases;
in fact landings declined remarkably during the end of
consolidation phase 1965–1990 at the same time as effort and
capacity-enhancing subsidies reached their all-time high (cf. Figs
2B, 3B, and 5A).  
Our hypothesis H2 was that path dependency would lead to
increasing investments in the main policy instruments over time.
Our data show that all the main policy instruments that existed
in the middle of the 20th century were still in operation toward
the early 1990s (including diesel that remains an invisible subsidy),
leaving the total program of governmental spending related to
the fishing sector intact in the period from WW2 until the late
20th century despite the fact that the magnitude of investments
have varied on annual and decadal scales (Fig. 1). However, since
year 2000, we see a possible acceleration of an already ongoing
trend where capacity enhancing subsidies has declined while
management and research has increased dramatically. This
gradual greening of the policy is ongoing. At the same time, it
must be noted that the total governmental (Swedish and EU)
spending on fisheries is on the highest level recorded (Fig. 2), at
the same time as the number of fishers have declined, which has
led to a dramatically increased management cost per active fisher
(Fig. A1.1) as well as increased subsidies as a fraction of landing
value (Fig. A1.2).
Fig. 5. Landings in the Swedish sea fishery 1914–2015. (A)
Landing quantities. Note that the trend is mainly driven by two
groups, herring (Clupea harengus) and forage fish, which in turn
consists of a few different species used for reduction to fish
meal and fish oil, mainly sprat (Sprattus sprattus), blue whiting
(Micromesistius poutassou), sand eel (Ammodytes sp.), and
herring. (B) Landing value. Note the more even distribution
between groups, and the relatively large share of “other
species” and that total landing value peaked as early as 1963
despite the subsequent strong increase in fishing power. Other
species mentioned in the figure are Atlantic cod (Gadus
morhua), Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus), and Northern
prawn (Pandalus borealis).
Policy actors 1922–2010
The fishing industry has had the highest representation in the
government committees commissioned to propose fisheries
reform in the period 1992–2010 (Fig. 6). The other two groups
that have been consistently represented in the committees are the
fisheries management agency and the Ministry of Agriculture
(Fig. 6). However, year 2010 stands out as other actors have had
a significant (42%) representation (mean 1922–1992: 10%, range:
0–25%; Fig. 6). Those actors included, e.g., NGOs for the
environment, recreational fisheries, and people in coastal and
archipelagic regions, and several ministries, including the
Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Defense.
Despite the fact that the original three actors together had 58%
of the representation, it illustrates that it has been possible for
stakeholder groups other than commercial fishermen to influence
policy in recent years. In summary, we find that actor
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constellations have been relatively intact between 1922 and 1992,
giving support to hypothesis H3. Because the government
committees are conceived to include all relevant interests in the
formulation of a new policy, the lack of “other” actors in this
long period signals a concentration of power in a small group, as
further evidenced by the sudden shift observed in 2010. The “new”
actors represented in the 2010 committee existed also in the earlier
periods, indicating a true shift in the representation and not only
in the availability of stakeholders.
Fig. 6. Representation in the Committees presenting the
Swedish Government Official Reports in the period 1922–2010.
The committees for the years 1937, 1970, and 1989 were not
included because of the few members and the limited scope of
the assignment to those committees. For 1922 and 1951, there
were a few members for which we have not found any
biographical information that could be used to categorize them.
Resistance to shocks in subsidy spending
The final step of our analytical strategy was to test quantitatively
whether macroeconomic data, political regimes, or general system
performance could explain the change in subsidies over time. We
tested two dependent variables, total spending and subsidy color
(fraction negative to positive subsidies), and found that neither
political, macroeconomic factors (including oil price), nor system
fisheries performance (landing value) could explain any of the
variation in these variables (Fig. 7, Tables A1.4-A1.7). In both
sets of models, the data for the year before was the only strong
predictor (mean value of 1-year autocorrelation [AR1] 0.75 and
0.66 for total spending and subsidy color, respectively, Tables
A1.6-A1.7), in itself  an indication of path dependence.
Autocorrelation on 2–5 years lag (AR2-5) did not contribute
significantly to predicting subsidy color or total subsidy level.
DISCUSSION
Historical trajectory of Swedish commercial fisheries
Many commercial fisheries have collapsed despite strong
governmental institutions, significant research efforts, and
detailed management plans. Could an increased understanding
of the historical institutional dynamics reveal drivers behind the
suboptimal performance of fisheries and other natural resource
systems? To investigate this, we applied path dependency theory
in a long-term analysis of Swedish fisheries policy. We formulated
four hypotheses about the existence of a path dependence in the
period from the start of Swedish official fisheries policy (early
1900s) until the end of the 20th century. The first hypothesis (H1)
stated that we expected stability over time in how policy goals
were conceived by institutional actors, and the analysis of key
policy documents from the period 1922–1994 showed that the
dominating pattern was an evolution toward more complexity yet
a notable avoidance of references to ecological sustainability. The
second hypothesis (H2) stated that investments in policy
instruments would increase over time. Again, we found some
support for the hypothesis in the data: total governmental
spending displayed a steady increase over time while it must be
noted that the type of subsidies has gradually changed toward
more beneficial and less capacity-enhancing. The third hypothesis
(H3) was about actor constellations, and we found that the set of
actors active within the institutional framework remained more
or less unchanged before the Swedish EU entrance with a high
dominance of representatives from the fishing industry during
the whole study period and very little involvement of other
stakeholders. The fourth hypothesis (H4) was about the
robustness of the path dependence trajectory, where we found
that history (spending in the year before) was indeed the only
factor we could link to subsidy spending and that macroeconomic,
political, and fisheries performance (landing values) factors had
no measurable effect.
Fig. 7. Independent variables used to investigate drivers behind
changes in subsidies.
The Swedish EU entrance in 1995 changed a number of things.
Policy goals have increasingly included references to ecological
sustainability, notably through noting the limits to biological
productivity (EC 1992), sustainable exploitation (EC 2002), and
after the most recent reform through the goal of all stocks at the
maximum sustainable yield level (EC 2013). Although the total
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spending on fisheries continues to increase, the “greening” trend
that has been present during the whole study period seems to have
accelerated since the EU entrance with a growing proportion of
money on research and management and proportionally less on
capacity-enhancing subsidies.
Indicators of path dependency
We defined policy instruments as the governmental spending on
subsidies, monitoring, and control, which are indeed key
instruments of the government in supporting fisheries, and which
can illustrate the general direction of the policy (Sumaila et al.
2010). Another important role of the government is to regulate
fisheries through laws and regulations, such as quotas and other
technical measures. The laws and regulations could be analyzed
to offer a complementary perspective on the policy directions
during the study period (Hentati-Sundberg and Hjelm 2014, Stoll
et al. 2016). We anticipate that a long-term analysis of Swedish
fisheries regulations would pick up a similar trend as the subsidy
analysis, with initially very few regulations, and in the most recent
few years a greening trend representing the rising sustainability
awareness.  
Several factors seem to have contributed to path dependency in
our fisheries management system. Many of the subsidy programs
were set up to be long-term and thereby resistant to changing
political winds. Payments to the industry did not need to be
decided by the parliament on an annual basis, instead pointwise
large investments were made in government-run “capital funds”
that operated in parallel with the yearly budget negotiations. The
stability of actor constellations within policy formulation created
increasing benefits for the actors within the policy subsystem, and
at the same time a marginalization of any opposing interest or
worldviews that could have proposed alternative trajectories.
Needless to say, neither the ecosystems themselves nor coming
generations were represented in the tight interest coalitions that
were set up to promote technological progress, cheap nutrition,
export incomes, and stable income levels for fishermen.  
Complementary evidence suggests that stable actor constellations
may have been a factor contributing to path dependency in
Sweden. In 2011, two senior Swedish Board of Fisheries officials
were commissioned to write an epitaph about the agency,
discussing the evolution of fisheries management and providing
illustrative examples from its 63-year existence. In their summary
of the last decades’ fisheries policy, they indeed described it as
emerging from an “iron triangle” formed by the Swedish Board
of Fisheries, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Swedish
Fishermen’s Association (Westerberg and Ask 2011). The use of
the “iron triangle” metaphor echoes political science research on
the ties between the Congress, the bureaucracy, and private
interests in the context of defense industry policy in the United
States (Adams 1981). It has been used to describe the ever-
increasing defense budget as a result of a policy subgovernment,
emerging from the mutual interest of the three actors to maintain
the status quo, and thus to detach policy from influence from the
parliament (Adams 1981). Our data show that the management
authorities have been so strongly involved in industry
development that it has served largely as a support function rather
than a regulator; industry representatives were also on the board
of the Swedish Board of Fisheries from its establishment in 1948
until the early 2000s (Ask et al. 2015). Earlier examples of such
interwoven roles and responsibilities between fishing industries
and national agencies include the French governmental research
institute IFREMER leading the development of driftnet fishing
for tuna in the Bay of Biscay in the 1980s, resulting in stock
depletion, massive bycatches, and conflicts with traditional
fishing practices (Lequesne 2004), and Finley’s (2011) work on
how the U.S. government in the early 1900s supported long
distance tuna fisheries, triggering conflict with coastal states and
contributing to overfishing.
Path dependency and sustainability
How has path-dependency in the policy subsystem influenced
sustainability? We suggest a pivotal role of the iron triangle in
driving the historical overexploitation. The increasing subsidy
levels and corresponding fleet size increase observed until the late
1980s in effect detached the profitability of the fishing industry
from the state of the ecosystems. In the language of economics,
the ecosystems were externalized. At the same time could money
transfers from the government ensure continued support for the
status quo both within the growing bureaucracy (the agency) and
the industry? We illustrate these stabilizing feedbacks in Fig. 8A.
We acknowledge that such strong industry-government ties have
had a role in many parts of Swedish governance (Lewin and
Lindvall 2015), in fact fishing has been governed as just another
sector and promoted and supported in the same way as has been
(more or less) working for other sectors of the society.  
We also acknowledge that many other countries and regions have
had similar trajectories in fisheries with industry expansion
policies gradually replaced by a rational exploitation focus with
varying degree of success (Finley 2011, Österblom and Folke
2015). A fair question to ask is whether there were any perceivable
alternatives that could have changed the trajectory of Swedish
policy during the study period? We argue that although there are
many similarities between countries and regions, especially in
terms of the fisheries expansion policies after World War 2, many
countries have actually initiated reforms because of the low social,
economic, and ecological performance of these policies.
Examples include the early 1980s transition to transferable quotas
in Iceland to increase efficiency and reduce overcapacity (Arnason
2005) and the decentralization policies aimed at involving a
broader set of stakeholders in fisheries decision making in the U.
S. and Canada since the 1970s (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). A
recent study also has shown convincingly that path dependency
can result in alternative stable states as a result of slow
institutional change and exclusive harvesting rights, as in this
study (Tekwa et al. 2019). Our conclusion also reinforces earlier
studies pointing at path dependency as a major force preventing
change in fisheries management systems, inside and outside the
EU (e.g., Hegland and Raakjæer 2008, Jacobsen 2019).  
Standing out in our study is the rapidly increasing cost of fisheries
management and research: current numbers are 28% (total
expenditure) and 23% (management cost) of the gross landing
value of the Swedish fishery[1]. Comparable numbers reported for
Iceland, Norway, and the Newfoundland at the end of the 1990s
were 3%, 10%, and 15–25%, respectively (Arnason et al. 2000).
Our analysis omits costs for the Coastguard and the fisheries
section at the Ministry, suggesting that the current Swedish
fisheries management is some of the costliest ever reported
(Arnason et al. 2000). Whether these high costs are motivated is
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Fig. 8. Conceptual model of (A) the main dynamics for the pre-EU period as described in this paper, and
(B) a possible alternative system dynamic without subsidies. In (A), the “iron triangle” of the government,
the agency, and the industry creates a reinforcing feedback that boosts the size of the industry and
simultaneously the need for regulation, resulting in an increased bureaucracy. By consequence, the
environment is externalized. In (B), fleet subsidies are suspended, and the size of the industry is more
directly dependent on the ecosystem. Consequently, the iron triangle is replaced by a social-ecological (re)
connection, with the ecosystem internalized and thereby possibly fostering resource stewardship among
the industry actors.
in the end a matter of societal priorities. Somewhat provokingly,
one could ask whether coalitions between EU institutions and
national and international research institutes can create a new
form a path dependency with ever-increasing spending on
research and management.
The future
A long-term sustainable fishery requires an institutional
framework that identifies and acts on signals from the ecosystem
(Wilson 2006, Crona et al. 2016). Whether these actions are best
mediated through formal institutions (as is the setup in most
European fisheries) or through self-organized communities or
industries will depend on specific circumstances and will likely
need to vary from fishery to fishery (Mahon et al. 2008). What is
a general feature, however, is the need to create incentive structures
that promote learning and adaptability to the variability of
ecosystems and discourage short-sightedness, overinvestment,
and overexploitation. Here, elimination of capacity enhancing
subsidies must be a key priority for government officials in the
coming years. It is therefore a worrying signal that the EU
parliament on 4 April 2019 voted for the reintroduction of vessel
construction subsidies from 2021, a position that awaits the
response from the EU Council of Ministers.  
We sketch out an alternative fisheries management system
configuration where the environment is internalized as a social-
ecological (re)connection (Fig. 8B), alluding to calls for human
reconnection to the biosphere (Folke et al. 2011). In this systems
configuration, fishing actors’ profitability is directly linked to the
state of the ecosystem, something that is expected to increase
support for monitoring, enforcement, and precautionary
regulatory measures. Acquiring a balance between fishing fleet
size and fishing opportunities, finding strategies to increase prices,
lower the cost of effort, and increase understanding for the
underlying ecosystem are possible long-term effects of a gradual
reconnection policy for fisheries. In the long term, rebuilt
ecosystems will create increased social and economic benefits that
will also reduce the relative cost of management and enforcement.
These feedbacks resemble how fisheries policy in Norway and
North America has been described earlier, in contrast to the
European Union, which has had persistent problems with
overcapacity, noncompliance, and low scientific legitimacy (cf.
Figs 1 and 2 in Österblom et al. 2011).  
We argue that some signs of change in this direction are already
visible within EU and in Sweden. The strong actor constellations
in Sweden have loosened, partly through the replacement of the
Swedish Board of Fisheries with the Swedish Agency for Marine
and Water management in 2011 (Österblom et al. 2017). In the
EU, one of the main targets behind the most recent Common
Fisheries Policy reform was to decrease the regulation burden
(micromanagement) on the fishing industry that has arisen as a
response to overfishing, in turn (as suggested by this paper)
resulting from the expansive national policies put forward by
national governments during the 20th century. Another concrete
action in the 2013 version of the Common Fisheries Policy is the
regionalization, meaning that some of the responsibility of the
centralized EU administration is distributed to regional bodies
(Symes 2012). At the same time, fishing businesses are increasingly
transnational with a low number of globally dominant actors
(Österblom et al. 2015). In light of these changes we see a new
possible governance trajectory with a diminished role for national
governments and an increase of business or community-driven
initiatives.  
__________  
[1] Comparison made for year 2013, which is the last year of
available landing data.
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Appendix 1. Supplementary Methods and Results. 
 
Iron-triangles and subsidies. Understanding the long-term role of the government on 
Swedish commercial fisheries 
 
 
1. Supplementary methods 
 
The Swedish entrance in the European Union in 1995 involved a change in that the majority 
of the fisheries subsidies were from this year transferred directly from the EU Commission to 
the fishing industry and organizations linked to the fishing industry. In the Swedish national 
budget, such expenditures are referred to as “Structural grants to the fisheries sector funded 
by EU” with no further specification. Therefore, we analyzed separately those expenditures 
based on raw data from the EU Commission and the corresponding Swedish agency, Swedish 
Board of Agriculture, disaggregated for each individual project. All those subsidies were 
categorized according to the same categories as the historical subsidies (project assignment to 
categories in Table A1.3) and aggregated per category and year. Note that whereas the 
subsidies preceding 1995 were budget posts (i.e. proposed spending) the data for post-1995 
EU structural grants were actual spending. Specifically, during parts of the study, some items 
were officially budgeted 1000 SEK (a very low number), which technically meant that 
spending was possible if needed. But in line with earlier work that have used budgets to make 
inference on economic-political change (Bristol, 2009; Furman, 2006; Moehlmann, 1992) we 
argue that the difference between using data on budget proposals versus real spending make 
no crucial difference in interpreting long-term trends in different subsidies and their effect on 
fishing fleets, and ultimately on sustainability.  
 
In 2011, another important change took place: the agency “Swedish Board of Fisheries” was 
replaced by “Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management” (SwAM). The new 
agency had a broader mandate also including water issues and the marine environment, and 
consequently not all money distributed to this agency was commercial fisheries related. For 
2011-2015 we therefore used the Annual reports of the agency to consider only spending 
directly related to fisheries management and research.  
 
  
Table A1.1. Types of subsidies to given to Swedish fisheries, and classification following (Sumaila et al., 2010), 
description and motivation of the classification. See also Appendix Tables A1.1 and A1.2 with a complete list of 
all subsidies reported in Swedish budget proposals and from EU structural grants, respectively, and for which 
years they apply. We combined the two beneficial subsidy categories (1.1) Fisheries management and (1.2) 
Fishery research into one category, because research activities were often reported as a part of the management 
activities and thus not tractable through the whole series.  
 
Type of subsidy 
Classificatio
n 
Description Motivation to classification 
1.1 Fisheries 
management 
programs and 
services and 
Fisheries Research 
Beneficial 
Grants to the Swedish Board of Fisheries and its 
predecessors. In this, also governmental funded 
fisheries research is included.  
Fisheries management and research generally aims 
at ensuring sustainable exploitation of the resources. 
Some of the research has in fact been aiming at 
improving commercial fisheries endeavors (c.f. cat 
2.5), but there were not enough details in the data to 
distinguish the exact purpose of individual research 
activities.  
2.1 Fuel subsidies  
Capacity-
enhancing 
Direct support for fuel purchase and restitution 
of fuel tax. The fact that diesel for fishing 
vessels (as for other shipping) is excepted from 
tax is probably the largest subsidy, it has 
however not been quantified in this paper as it is 
invisible in the government budget. Thus our 
estimate of this is conservative.  
Fuel subsidies decrease the operating cost for fishing 
vessel which leads to a higher fishing effort than 
without subsidies in the short term, and possibly the 
indirect effect of higher investment due to higher 
profitability of fishing operations. 
2.2 Vessel 
construction 
renewal and 
modernization 
programs  
Capacity-
enhancing 
Support for vessel construction and vessel 
equipment, such as motors, and equipment for 
fish catching, on-board processing, 
communication and safety equipment.  
Vessel subsidies lead to higher investment in the 
fishing fleet and thus directly impacting the fleet 
size.  
2.3 Fishing port 
construction and 
renovation 
programs  
Capacity-
enhancing 
Grant towards construction of new ports and 
renovation/reparation of old ports 
Port subsidies supports the infrastructure necessary 
for commercial fishing operations and thus lead to 
increased total fishing capacity.  
2.4 Price and 
marketing support, 
processing and 
storage 
infrastructure 
programs  
Capacity-
enhancing 
Two types of support that are relatively different 
are aggregated in this category: (1) Direct 
market support, and (2) Support to processing 
and storage infrastructure. Direct market support 
has taken various forms, including fixed or 
variable amounts paid to fishers by kilo of fish 
caught, or special export grants for fish. 
Processing and storage infrastructure include 
support for building and renovating all types of 
fisheries infrastructure that is not onboard of 
vessels (cat. 2.2) and that is not in ports (cat. 
2.3), e.g. fish processing facilities.   
Price regulation directly influence the cost-benefit 
equilibrium of individual fishing operations and thus 
lead to higher fishing effort. Processing and storage 
infrastructure is a condition for profitable fishing 
operations and government-supported investments 
will lead to a higher profitability for the sector.  
2.5 Fishery 
development 
projects and 
support services  
Capacity-
enhancing 
This category includes various types of support 
to the fishing sector, often presented as 
development projects, with an active 
involvement by the government. Examples 
include development of new fishing gears, 
fishing areas and processing methods, but could 
also be more direct support to fishing 
endeavours such as ice-breaking or supply ships 
for distant water fisheries.  
These subsidies aim at developing fishing new types 
of fishing activities, processing techniques or 
markets, thereby directly leading to increased fishing 
effort.  
3.1 Fisher 
assistance program  
Ambiguous 
Fisher assistance programs aim at providing 
support to fishers during bad times, temporarily 
or permanently. Example include support to the 
unemployment fund and transition support for 
retraining commercial fishers in other 
businesses.   
These subsidies provide financial security for fishers 
to not fish, and thereby leads to decreased fishing 
effort. On the other hand, fishers’ knowledge about 
such government-aided security may lead to over-
investment in fishing capacity. It is therefore 
classified as an ambiguous subsidy.  
3.2 Vessel buyback 
programs  
Ambiguous 
Grants paid out in exchange for vessel 
decommissioning/scrapping.   
According to a similar logic as for (3.1), vessel 
decommissioning can lead to an effort decrease, but 
also to over-investment. Experience also show that 
money used for decommissioning has often been 
used for construction of new vessels; this has even 
been one of the goals of Swedish decommission 
policy in some periods (SOU, 1992) 
 
 
 
Table A1.2. All grants to the fishing industry and fisheries management as reported in the budget proposals for 
the Swedish government 1914-2015, their year of availability and their categorization into descriptive and 
normative categories according to Sumaila et al. 2010.  
 
Budget post Category (description) 
Category 
(normative) 
Years 
Education of fisheries managers 
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1953-1966 
Fisheries superintendents: operating costs 
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1948-1968 
Fisheries superintendents: salaries 
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1948-1991 
Glass eel collection station in Trollhättan 
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1921 
Local fisheries managers  
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 
1922-1929, 
1931-1934 
Surveillance for mitigating negative impacts on 
fisheries through water pollution 
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1938-1941 
The fisheries management authority: Material 
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1942 
The fisheries management authority: Operating 
costs 
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1942-1948 
The fisheries management authority: salaries 
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1942-1948 
The Swedish Board of Fisheries, the fisheries 
inspection unit: operating costs  
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1958-1966 
The Swedish Board of Fisheries, the fisheries 
inspection unit: salaries  
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1958-1966 
The Swedish Board of Fisheries: inventories 
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1947 
The Swedish Board of Fisheries: operation costs  
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1948-1968 
The Swedish Board of Fisheries: salaries  
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial 1948-2015 
Fisheries research vessel 1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1970-1974 
Hydrographical-biological research for Swedish 
waters.  
1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 
1914-1921, 
1926 
Hydrographical-biological research for Swedish 
waters. Contribution to international research 
station for hydrographical-biological research 
1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1926-1934 
Hydrographical-biological research for Swedish 
waters. Hydrographical data collection  
1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1922-1934 
Hydrographical-biological research for Swedish 
waters. Insurance for research vessel.  
1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1914-1922 
Hydrographical-biological research for Swedish 
waters. Operating cost for research vessel 
Eystrasalt. 
1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1914-1934 
Hydrographical-biological research for Swedish 
waters. Research  
1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1922-1944 
Hydrographical-biological research for Swedish 
waters. Research vessel Skagerak. 
1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1914-1935 
Re-introduction of European plaice 1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1935-1938 
State owned fisheries research vessel: operating 
costs 
1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1936-1947 
State owned fisheries research vessel: other 
costs 
1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1940, 1945 
State owned fisheries research vessel: salaries 1.2. Fishery R&D Beneficial 1936-1947 
Remedy to fishermen for fuel tax payment  2.1. Fuel Subsidies 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1935-1951, 
1952-1981 
Loans for vessel construction and modernization 
2.2. Boat construction, renewal 
and modernization programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1919, 1921, 
1931, 1933-
1934, 1937, 
1949, 1951-
1956, 1958-
1993 
Support for radiotelegraph and radiotelephone 
equipment on fishing vessels 
2.2. Boat construction, renewal 
and modernization programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1950-1969 
Port construction 
2.3. Fishing port construction and 
renovation programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1914-1919 
Port construction in Östra torp (Malmöhus 
county) 
2.3. Fishing port construction and 
renovation programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1914, 1917 
Support for minor fishing port facilities 
2.3. Fishing port construction and 
renovation programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1919 
Bonus for onboard salting of North Sea herring 
2.4. Marketing and Storage 
infrastructure 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1948 
Costs for quality control at fish and fish product 
exports 
2.4. Marketing and Storage 
infrastructure 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1950 
Grants for regulating the trade of fresh herring 
2.4. Marketing and Storage 
infrastructure 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1938-1946 
Loans for processing and marketing of fish 
2.4. Marketing and Storage 
infrastructure 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1941-1943, 
1945-1949, 
1951-1953, 
1957, 1962-
1983 
Market support to the fishing industry 
2.4. Marketing and Storage 
infrastructure 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1977-1993 
Support for processing and marketing of fish 
2.4. Marketing and Storage 
infrastructure 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1935-1941, 
1957-1959 
An armed steam ship to support and protect 
Swedish fishing fleets 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1914-1915,  
1920-1932 
Bonus for participation in herring fisheries is 
Iceland 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1937-1939, 
1945-1947 
Compensation to private water owners for 
commercial fishing 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1933-1951, 
1953-1995 
Courses for fishermen 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1970-1983 
Coverage for losses for governmental credits to 
fishermen 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1970-1985, 
1990 
Fisheries sector support: fisheries support in 
places of particular importance 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1923-1957 
Fishing industry 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1930 
Fishing vessel and fishing gear insurances: 
organization support 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1949, 1951-
1953, 1957 
Fishing vessel and fishing gear insurances: 
support at insurance losses  
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1949, 1951-
1953, 1957-
1958, 1960-
1961 
General support to the fishing industry 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1914-1929, 
1931-1993 
Grants for the arrangement of navigation courses 
for fishers in the Bohuslän county 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1914-1926 
Grants to "Svenska Fiskarenas studieförbund" 
(The Swedish fishers' educational association) 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1947 
Ice-breaking support to the fishing sector 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1945-1993 
Loans for fishing gears 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1939-1940, 
1947, 1961-
1962, 1972-
1977, 1980-
1982 
Safety equipment for fishing vessel navigation 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1936-1956 
Support for fisheries in distant waters 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1937-1938, 
1946-1969 
Support for the "Södra Sveriges fiskeriförening" 
(the South Sweden fisheries association) 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1914-1934 
Support to fishermen due to loss or destruction 
of fishing gear 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1935-1939, 
1958-1961 
Support vessel for Iceland herring fisheries 
2.5. Fishery development 
projects and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
1950-1969 
Loans to shrimp fishers 3.1. Fisher assistance programs Ambiguous 1964-1965 
Special support to the fishing sector 3.1. Fisher assistance programs Ambiguous 1994 
Special transition support for fishermen 3.1. Fisher assistance programs Ambiguous 1969-1978 
Support for fishermen 3.1. Fisher assistance programs Ambiguous 
1934, 1939-
1943 
Support for fishers at cancellation of previously 
sued fishing waters 
3.1. Fisher assistance programs Ambiguous 1970-1983 
Support for shrimp fishers 3.1. Fisher assistance programs Ambiguous 1964-1965 
Support to fishermen on the South and East 
coast and on Gotland 
3.1. Fisher assistance programs Ambiguous 1994 
Support for fisheries rationalization etc.  3.2. Vessel buyback programs Ambiguous 1979-1993 
Support for the "Södra Sveriges fiskeriförening" 
(the South Sweden fisheries association). 
Housing for the manager. 
X. Aquaculture (not included in 
analysis) 
NA 1930-1931 
Support for the "Södra Sveriges fiskeriförening" 
(the South Sweden fisheries association). Setting 
up aquaculture production facilities. 
X. Aquaculture (not included in 
analysis) 
NA 1928-1929 
Costs for fisheries investigation in water 
management court cases 
X. Freshwater fisheries (not 
included in analysis) 
NA 1969-1983 
Research and experiment station for freshwater 
fisheries: operating costs 
X. Freshwater fisheries (not 
included in analysis) 
NA 1931-1947 
Research and experiment station for freshwater 
fisheries: salaries 
X. Freshwater fisheries (not 
included in analysis) 
NA 1931-1947 
Research within the Freshwater research 
laboratory 
X. Freshwater fisheries (not 
included in analysis) 
NA 
1950-1958, 
1960-1969 
Recreational fisheries support 
X. Recreational fisheries (not 
included in analysis) 
NA 1981- 2011 
 
 
Table A1.3. Grants to the fishing industry and fisheries management from the European fisheries funds 1995 – 
2014 and their categorization into descriptive and normative categories according to Sumaila et al. 2010. 
Abbreviations for the program periods: FIFG: Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance, EFF: European 
Fisheries Fund.  
 
Project description Category (description) 
Category 
normative 
Program period 
Common activities 1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial EFF2004-2015 
Pilot or demonstration projects 1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Protection of Aquatic resources 1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial EFF2004-2015 
Technical Assistance (e.g. 
studies, exchange of 
experiences, management and 
implementation of programmes) 
1.1. Fisheries management 
programs and services 
Beneficial FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Investments onboard of fishing 
vessels 
2.2. Boat construction, renewal 
and modernization programs 
Beneficial FIFG1995-2007 
Change of fishing vessel 2.2. Boat construction, renewal 
and modernization programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
EFF2004-2015 
Construction of fishing vessels 2.2. Boat construction, renewal 
and modernization programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Investments onboard of fishing 
vessels (improvement of energy 
efficiency, hygiene, onboard 
safety, product quality, working 
conditions, selectivity and 
motor exchange) 
2.2. Boat construction, renewal 
and modernization programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
EFF2004-2015 
Modernization of fishing vessel 2.2. Boat construction, renewal 
and modernization programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Construction of new port 
facilities/extension of existing 
port facilities 
2.3. Fishing port construction 
and renovation programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 
Equipment in fishing ports 2.3. Fishing port construction Capacity- EFF2004-2015 
and renovation programs enhancing 
Investments in fishing ports 2.3. Fishing port construction 
and renovation programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
EFF2004-2015 
Modernisation of existing port 
facilities 
2.3. Fishing port construction 
and renovation programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Fish processing and marketing - 
construction, equipment or 
modernization of sales units 
2.4. Price and marketing support, 
processing and storage 
infrastructure programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Fish processing and marketing - 
construction, equipment or 
modernization of processing 
unit  
2.4. Price and marketing support, 
processing and storage 
infrastructure programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Promotional activities - advice, 
sales support, sales campaigns, 
and other services 
2.4. Price and marketing support, 
processing and storage 
infrastructure programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
EFF2004-2015 
Promotional activities - market 
and consumer surveys, trade 
fairs.  
2.4. Price and marketing support, 
processing and storage 
infrastructure programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Quality certification and 
product labelling operations 
2.4. Price and marketing support, 
processing and storage 
infrastructure programs 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 
Branch common activities - 
establishment of producer 
organization (PO) 
2.5 Fishery development projects 
and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
EFF2004-2015 
Branch common activities - 
other activities 
2.5 Fishery development projects 
and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
EFF2004-2015 
Development of fishing areas 2.5 Fishery development projects 
and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
EFF2004-2015 
Operations by members of the 
trade (setting up producer 
organisations, aid to assist their 
drive to improve quality etc.) 
2.5 Fishery development projects 
and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 
Setting-up aid for young 
fishermen 
2.5 Fishery development projects 
and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Support to small-scale coastal 
fishing 
2.5 Fishery development projects 
and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Support to small-scale coastal 
fishing - integrated and 
collective projects 
2.5 Fishery development projects 
and support services 
Capacity-
enhancing 
EFF2004-2015 
Temporary cessation of 
activities and other financial 
compensation 
3.1. Fisher assistance programs Ambigous FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Exportation/Reassignment/Tran
sfer of vessel to third country 
3.2. Vessel buyback programs Ambigous FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Rebuilding of vessel to non-
fisheries purpose 
3.2. Vessel buyback programs Ambigous EFF2004-2015 
Scrapping of vessel 3.2. Vessel buyback programs Ambigous FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Increase in aquaculture 
production capacity 
X. Aquaculture (not included in 
analysis) 
NA FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Increase in number of fish 
smolt from hatchery 
X. Aquaculture (not included in 
analysis) 
NA EFF2004-2015 
Modernisation of existing 
aquaculture units 
X. Aquaculture (not included in 
analysis) 
NA FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Construction of inland vessels X. Freshwater fisheries (not 
included in the analysis) 
NA FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Inland fisheries - other activities X. Freshwater fisheries (not 
included in the analysis) 
NA EFF2004-2015 
Investments in inland fisheries 
facilities 
X. Freshwater fisheries (not 
included in the analysis) 
NA EFF2004-2015 
Modernisation of inland fishing 
vessels 
X. Freshwater fisheries (not 
included in the analysis) 
NA FIFG1995-2007 & 
EFF2004-2015 
Other measures to assist inland 
fishing 
X. Freshwater fisheries (not 
included in the analysis) 
NA FIFG1995-2007 
  
 2. Supplementary results 
 
Table A1.4. Model selection table for statistical models explaining total subsidy levels for 1914-1994. Average 
parameter values calculated from weighting all models are given in Table A1.6. Only first 30 models shown.   
 
Mod 
nr 
Interc
. AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 AR5 
dMan
ufact 
Land
val Oil Pol Yr df logLik AICc delta 
weigh
t 
1 0 0.775 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.187 4 -29.145 
66.81
7 0 0.036 
2 0 0.671 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.085 NA 0.235 5 -28.295 67.39 0.572 0.027 
3 0 0.74 NA NA NA 0.084 NA NA NA NA 0.149 5 -28.388 
67.57
7 0.76 0.025 
4 0 0.641 NA NA NA 0.08 NA NA 0.082 NA 0.198 6 -27.595 
68.32
5 1.508 0.017 
5 0 0.789 NA -0.119 NA 0.137 NA NA NA NA 0.164 6 -27.642 
68.41
9 1.602 0.016 
6 0 0.68 NA -0.146 NA 0.145 NA NA 0.099 NA 0.226 7 -26.483 68.5 1.683 0.015 
7 0 0.767 NA NA NA NA -0.03 NA NA NA 0.191 5 -28.86 
68.51
9 1.702 0.015 
8 -0.051 0.756 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA + 0.192 6 -27.834 
68.80
3 1.986 0.013 
9 0 0.812 -0.047 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.195 5 -29.052 
68.90
5 2.088 0.013 
10 -0.062 0.71 NA NA NA 0.103 NA NA NA + 0.146 7 -26.696 
68.92
6 2.109 0.013 
11 0 0.762 NA NA 0.028 NA NA NA NA NA 0.175 5 -29.071 
68.94
1 2.124 0.012 
12 -0.114 0.734 NA NA NA 0.173 NA 0.081 NA + NA 7 -26.713 
68.96
1 2.143 0.012 
13 0 0.793 NA -0.03 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.196 5 -29.082 
68.96
4 2.147 0.012 
14 0 0.824 NA NA NA 0.137 NA NA NA NA NA 4 -30.251 
69.02
8 2.211 0.012 
15 0 0.724 -0.093 NA NA NA NA NA 0.101 NA 0.26 6 -27.954 
69.04
4 2.227 0.012 
16 0 0.775 NA NA NA NA NA 0.008 NA NA 0.183 5 -29.126 
69.05
3 2.235 0.012 
17 0 0.716 -0.146 NA NA 0.107 NA NA 0.105 NA 0.225 7 -26.805 
69.14
5 2.328 0.011 
18 0 0.756 NA NA -0.099 0.156 NA NA NA NA 0.159 6 -28.007 69.15 2.333 0.011 
19 0 0.807 -0.097 NA NA 0.103 NA NA NA NA 0.159 6 -28.024 
69.18
3 2.366 0.011 
20 0 0.693 NA -0.05 NA NA NA NA 0.092 NA 0.255 6 -28.114 
69.36
3 2.546 0.01 
21 0 0.647 NA NA -0.128 0.172 NA NA 0.095 NA 0.218 7 -26.959 
69.45
2 2.635 0.01 
22 0 0.674 NA NA NA NA -0.02 NA 0.078 NA 0.234 6 -28.171 
69.47
7 2.659 0.009 
23 0 0.734 NA NA NA 0.08 -0.026 NA NA NA 0.155 6 -28.174 
69.48
3 2.666 0.009 
24 0 0.663 NA NA NA NA NA 0.021 0.092 NA 0.229 6 -28.18 
69.49
5 2.678 0.009 
25 0 0.736 NA NA NA 0.093 NA 0.023 NA NA 0.136 6 -28.256 
69.64
8 2.831 0.009 
26 0 0.667 NA NA 0.014 NA NA NA 0.083 NA 0.228 6 -28.275 
69.68
6 2.869 0.009 
27 -0.085 0.692 NA NA NA 0.131 NA 0.059 NA + 0.107 8 -25.874 
69.74
8 2.931 0.008 
28 -0.056 0.759 NA -0.119 NA 0.156 NA NA NA + 0.163 8 -25.919 
69.83
8 3.021 0.008 
29 -0.095 0.786 NA NA NA 0.152 NA NA NA + NA 6 -28.429 
69.99
3 3.176 0.007 
30 0 0.8 NA NA NA 0.145 NA 0.047 NA NA NA 5 -29.642 
70.08
4 3.267 0.007 
 
 
  
Table A1.5. Model selection table for statistical models explaining subsidy colour (fraction beneficial to 
capacity enhancing subsidies) for 1914-1994. Average parameter values calculated from weighting all models 
are given in Table A1.7. Only first 30 models shown.   
 
Mod 
Nr 
Inter
c. 
dMan
ufact 
Land
val Oil pol AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 AR5 
Y
r 
d
f logLik AICc delta 
weig
ht 
1 
-
0.34
9 NA NA NA + 
0.64
1 NA NA NA NA 
N
A 5 -74.877 
160.
55 0 
0.02
3 
2 
-
0.37
3 NA NA NA + 
0.66
9 NA NA NA 
-
0.10
5 
N
A 6 -73.911 
160.
96 
0.40
2 
0.01
9 
3 0 NA NA NA NA 
0.66
7 
0.21
1 NA NA 
-
0.13
6 
N
A 5 -75.113 
161.
03 
0.47
3 
0.01
8 
4 
-
0.32
2 NA NA NA + 
0.58
1 
0.16
3 NA NA 
-
0.13
9 
N
A 7 -72.843 
161.
22 
0.66
7 
0.01
6 
5 0 NA NA NA NA 
0.63
7 
0.19
4 NA NA 
-
0.16
5 
0.
1
2 6 -74.086 
161.
31 
0.75
2 
0.01
6 
6 
-
0.36
5 NA NA NA + 
0.63
6 NA NA 
0.15
5 
-
0.20
3 
N
A 7 -72.908 
161.
35 
0.79
6 
0.01
5 
7 0 NA NA NA NA 
0.77
3 NA NA NA NA 
N
A 3 -77.539 
161.
39 
0.83
6 
0.01
5 
8 0 NA NA NA NA 
0.66
3 
0.14
7 NA NA NA 
N
A 4 -76.584 
161.
69 1.14 
0.01
3 
9 -0.34 NA NA NA + 
0.64
2 NA NA NA 
-
0.13
7 
0.
1 7 -73.114 
161.
76 
1.20
8 
0.01
2 
10 
-
0.31
2 NA NA NA + 
0.57
9 
0.10
4 NA NA NA 
N
A 6 -74.418 
161.
97 
1.41
7 
0.01
1 
11 0 NA NA NA NA 
0.75
9 NA NA NA 
-
0.12
2 
0.
1
3 5 -75.631 
162.
06 
1.50
8 
0.01
1 
12 0 NA NA NA NA 0.73 NA NA NA NA 
0.
0
9 4 -76.84 
162.
21 
1.65
3 0.01 
13 
-
0.34
4 0.054 NA NA + 
0.63
3 NA NA NA NA 
N
A 6 -74.583 
162.
3 
1.74
7 0.01 
14 
-
0.32
7 NA NA NA + 
0.62
1 NA NA NA NA 
0.
0
6 6 -74.608 
162.
35 
1.79
7 
0.00
9 
15 0 NA NA NA NA 
0.80
6 NA NA NA 
-
0.08
5 
N
A 4 -76.913 
162.
35 
1.79
9 
0.00
9 
16 
-
0.29
7 NA NA NA + 
0.56
5 0.15 NA NA 
-
0.16
4 
0.
0
9 8 -72.208 
162.
42 
1.86
3 
0.00
9 
17 
-
0.35
5 NA NA NA + 
0.63
3 NA 
0.09
5 NA 
-
0.14
5 
N
A 7 -73.506 
162.
55 
1.99
3 
0.00
8 
18 
-
0.33
7 NA NA NA + 
0.61
6 NA NA 
0.13
9 
-
0.22
1 
0.
0
9 8 -72.298 
162.
6 
2.04
2 
0.00
8 
19 0 NA NA NA NA 
0.66
4 
0.17
9 NA 0.1 
-
0.19
4 
N
A 6 -74.743 
162.
62 
2.06
6 
0.00
8 
20 0 NA NA NA NA 
0.76
8 NA NA 
0.15
8 
-
0.18
9 
N
A 5 -75.914 
162.
63 
2.07
5 
0.00
8 
21 
-
0.32
8 NA NA NA + 
0.57
7 
0.12
6 NA 
0.11
6 
-
0.20
5 
N
A 8 -72.321 
162.
64 
2.08
9 
0.00
8 
22 0 NA NA 
0.0
6 NA 
0.66
5 
0.21
3 NA NA 
-
0.15
2 
N
A 6 -74.754 
162.
64 2.09 
0.00
8 
23 0 NA NA NA NA 
0.72
9 NA NA 
0.14
3 
-
0.21
4 
0.
1
2 6 -74.793 
162.
72 
2.16
6 
0.00
8 
24 
-
0.35
1 NA 
-
0.02
1 NA + 0.64 NA NA NA NA 
N
A 6 -74.832 
162.
8 
2.24
5 
0.00
7 
25 0 0.063 NA NA NA 
0.76
5 NA NA NA NA 
N
A 4 -77.146 
162.
82 
2.26
4 
0.00
7 
26 
-
0.34
5 NA NA 
0.0
08 + 
0.64
2 NA NA NA NA 
N
A 6 -74.871 
162.
88 
2.32
3 
0.00
7 
27 
-
0.34
8 NA NA NA + 
0.63
8 NA NA 
0.00
6 NA 
N
A 6 -74.874 
162.
88 
2.32
9 
0.00
7 
28 
-
0.34
7 NA NA NA + 
0.63
8 NA 
0.00
5 NA NA 
N
A 6 -74.875 
162.
89 
2.33
2 
0.00
7 
29 0 NA 
-
0.06
8 NA NA 
0.62
5 
0.18
3 NA NA 
-
0.16
9 
0.
1
6 7 -73.721 
162.
98 
2.42
2 
0.00
7 
30 
-
0.36
8 0.039 NA NA + 
0.66
1 NA NA NA 
-
0.09
8 
N
A 7 -73.756 
163.
05 
2.49
3 
0.00
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1.6. Average weighted parameter values for statistical models (mean and 95 % confidence intervals) for 
models for total subsidy level for 1914-1994.  
 
  mean lower upper 
Intercept -0.024 -0.161 0.113 
AR1 0.753 0.517 0.988 
AR2 -0.02 -0.173 0.133 
AR3 -0.026 -0.179 0.127 
AR4 -0.001 -0.146 0.144 
AR5 0.081 -0.117 0.278 
Yr 0.147 -0.076 0.371 
Oil 0.029 -0.089 0.146 
dManufact -0.006 -0.054 0.041 
polright 0.068 -0.184 0.32 
polsocial 0.02 -0.114 0.153 
Landval 0.013 -0.056 0.082 
   
Table A1.7. Average weighted parameter values for statistical models (mean and 95 % confidence intervals) for 
models for subsidy color (fraction beneficial to capacity enhancing subsidies) for 1914-1994.  
 
  mean lower upper 
Intercept -0.161 -0.58 0.257 
polright 0.227 -0.377 0.831 
polsocial 0.215 -0.31 0.739 
AR1 0.659 0.424 0.894 
AR2 0.064 -0.156 0.284 
AR3 0.007 -0.12 0.134 
AR4 0.026 -0.138 0.189 
AR5 -0.095 -0.315 0.125 
Landval -0.01 -0.102 0.081 
dManufact 0.014 -0.079 0.106 
Yr 0.045 -0.118 0.209 
Oil 0.006 -0.08 0.092 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig A1.1. Percent fishers in the Swedish population. Note that the fishing has never been a major Swedish 
industry (the fisher population never exceeded 0.15 %) but has decreased further since the 1960s. In 2014, the 
Swedish population was 9.7 million and the number of fishers were 1100, which yields the fraction fisher of the 
total population 0.01 %.  
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Fig A1.2. Time series of subsidy levels (all three categories): (A) per fisher, and (B) per total gross landing 
value. Note that both subsidy per fisher and subsidy in relation to landing value has increased strongly over time.   
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